Swarthmore College

Works
Political Science Faculty Works

Political Science

2016

Oxford Handbook Of American Political Development
Richard M. Valelly , '75
Swarthmore College, rvalell1@swarthmore.edu

S. Mettler
R. Lieberman

Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-poli-sci
Part of the Political Science Commons

Let us know how access to these works benefits you

Recommended Citation
Richard M. Valelly , '75; S. Mettler; and R. Lieberman. (2016). "Oxford Handbook Of American Political
Development". Oxford Handbook Of American Political Development. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780199697915.001.0001
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-poli-sci/570

This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Political Science Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact
myworks@swarthmore.edu.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
The Distinctiveness and Necessity of American Political
Development

SUZANNE METTLER AND RICHARD M. VALELLY

volume showcases an cinalytic approach to researching and understanding US
politics that first came on the scene some thirty years ago; it carries the same name as its
subject of study-''.American political development" or APD. APD still retains a critical
edge that can be traced to its origins as a dissenting form of political science. An insurgent group of scholars associated with the general renewal of historical institutionalism
(March and Olsen 1984) urged colleagues across the social sciences to "bring the state
back in;' publishing an edited volume under that banner (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and
Skocpol 1985). Stephen Skowronek's roughly contemporaneous book, Building a New
American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920, epitomized the value of applying such an approach to American politics (Skowronek 1982).
Skowronek's study-now regarded as a classic_:.:_traced the fraught, arduous struggle to
construct government agencies that could better accomplish crucial tasks of governance. It thus put the development of state capacity front and center as a major dynamic
that ramified throughout all of American politics.
In 1986 Karen Orren and Skowronek launched a journal entitled Studies in American
Political Development, thereby coining and entrenching the term "American political
development:' Also, Amy Bridges played a critical role in founding, along with David
Brady, the Politics and History Organized Section of the American Political Science
Association. The APD approach truly took flight 1
The study of APD has attracted not only scholars who directly focus on its various
facets and concerns but also many other scholars who have other primary interestssuch as the presidency and Congress-and who find the APD sensibility quite useful for
enriching their studies. As Jeffery Jenkins shows in this volume, a remarkably similar
interest in understanding institutions and their history simultaneously emerged among
rational choice scholars as they took stock of the instability theorems. These theorems
THIS
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(the Arrow Theorem, the Condorcet Paradox, and the McKelvey Chaos Theorem, to
name the best known) raised the obvious question of why there was so much real world
stability (Tullock 1981). The door to institutional analysis-and to treatment of institutional creation, evolution, and stability-consequently swung open in that part of
political science as well.
Moreover, a consciously historical and evolutionary sensibility has migrated into the
behavioral core of the field. Increasingly political behavior scholars have considered
how to recover public opinion and its determinants and representational consequences
before the rise of the modern survey. (See, for example, Dykstra and Hahn 1968; Lee
2002; Karol 2007.) Thanks to the award-winning efforts of Adam Berinsky and Eric
Schickler-with input from several talented colleagues-the earliest "modern'' surveys
of the 1930s and 1940s have been reconstructed and reweighted, permitting a wide range
of new investigations into the rise of mass liberalism and conservatism in the twentieth
century (Berinsky 2006; Berinsky, Powell, Schickler, and Yohai 2011).
APD scholars have also considered whether and how policy feedback alters the mass
bases of politics-and thus the options available to party politicians and elected officials
(Pierson 1993; Campbell 2012). In/loing this, they have shown that the state sometimes
shapes society as much as society shapes the state. A paradigmatic case is the GI Bill. It
fed back into American politics and decisively generated the civic engagement of a key
population among the citizenry-returning World War II veterans (Mettler 2005; see
also Mettler and Milstein 2007).
Given how extensively the APD approach has recast the study of American politics,
we believed that the time had clearly come for a Handbook on American Political
Development. As its editors we have spent the past several years considering what
has evolved over the decades following APD's birth. We have solicited the collection
of essays here to indicate the value, scope, and promise of pursuing it. The volume
is not, we hasten to add, exhaustive. Nonetheless, the contents of the volume speak
for themselves, indicating the breadth and depth of the approach and the many avenues it offers for furthering our understanding of American politics. Our contribution, with this introduction, is not to preview and summarize each essay but instead
to offer broad observations about the distinctiveness of APD and its value to the
larger discipline.

A WIDE-ANGLE LENS
Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of APD analysis is the ambitious scope and
historical depth of the analysis that its followers often undertake. Much of the study of •
American politics takes what Paul Pierson has dubbed a "pizza pie approach:' Pierson
pictures "[h]ighly institutionalized and very large communities of researchers" who
"focus on particular slices of the political system (Congress, the presidency, interest
groups, parties, etc.):' Each of these, in turn, focuses on specific "sites and modes of
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political activity;' meaning particular institutions, or forms of organization, or types of
political action (Pierson 2007, 147.) This creates high-resolution precision and clarityand yields deep understandings of a wide range of vital phenomena, such as the politics
of congressional committee jurisdictions, the rise of czars in the White House, whether
referenda produce civic engagement, and the variability of Supreme Court medians, just
to name a few. Meanwhile, the methodological individualism that suffuses American
political science has also pushed ever further into cognitive and affective psychology,
neurobiology, and genetics. Combined with the explosion of experimentalism, these
inquiries have opened up new and exciting vistas on American democracy's individuallevel foundations.
APD plays, however; an equally vital role by exploiting the possibilities of ;'macro"
and longitudinal treatment of American politics. Scholars of APD typically use a widerangle lens in their analysis, looking at the historically evolved relationship between some
institution and some type of organization or activity, or more broadly, at the politics that
has emerged between a pair of institutions, or even at the level of the political system as a
whole, across the federal or state levels or between them. (See, for instance, Crowe 2012;
Lavelle 2013; Schickler 2001.) APD embraces holism. To put the point another way, APD
helps analysts.of American politics to see the pizza for the slices!
The wide-angle lens indeed permits APD scholars to broach the proverbial "big questions:' They include the origins and temporal variability of power in the American political system and how it operates, the striking persistence of constitutional forms despite
the Civil War and the New Deal, when and how political change occurs, the legitimacy
of the administrative state, who gets represented by a given set of political circumstances, how such developments affect society or the economy, whether the American
regime nurtures virtue, character, and generous civic engagement, whether the public
interest can be identified and prevail, the extent to which civil-military relations are
healthy, whether public problems can be addressed and solved, whether government is
bloated, the many meanings of citizenship-and, not least, the survival of the American
regime itself. These questions constituted the major concerns of such erstwhile luminaries as (among others) Martha Derthick, Samuel P. Huntington, Theodore Lowi, and
James Q. Wilson.
APD scholarship aspires to carry on that ambitious legacy. As the discipline of political science has matured the monographic studies that self-consciously engage these
kinds of big questions can certainly be found-for example, in the work of Larry Bartels
and Nolan McCarty, who happen 'to be two of our volume contributors. But our pair
of examples make our point: senipr scholars typically ask the big questions, but junior
scholars refrain from doing so. The premium on methodological virtuosity has never
been greater. Add to that the new and overriding interest in resolving problems of causal
inference. Many scholars today easily conclude that they ought to first work long and
hard in the positivist trenches-helping to build a "normal science" of experimental
results that are reported in very rigorous and brief articles-before they dare to look up
toward the horizon of regime-level issues. 2 The obvious concern is that if they put off
learning how to think at the regime level they may never get to do it at all.
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By contrast, the study of American political development more readily breaks open
regime-level questions. It does this because of its holism, its emphasis on vital arcs of
change, and its attendant effort to figure out what they mean. There is a trade-off: the
reliability of the proposed causal inferences is not taken as utterly primary (though
they are taken quite seriously through various kinds of checks, such as counterfactual
analysis.) But by the same token we try to honestly figure out what the wide-angle
view is telling us.
, One very useful consequence-as Kimberly Morgan's chapter suggests-is the facilitation of cross-national comparative analysis. (For an example of what we mean, one
that draws in part on APD work, see Stepan and Linz 2011.) We hardly claim that all APD
work operates nimbly at the level of "the regime:' Much APD work certainly focuses on
elaborating and extending the generalizations and formulations ofleading APD scholars rather than breaking new ground. But we do think that there is more of an "elective
affinity" -to borrow from Goethe (2000 [1809])-between APD work and regime-level
reflection and generalization. As we have emphasized, several of the contributions to
this volume reflect that elective affini~.

I

INSTITUTIONS MATTER
As the previous discussion has suggested, the phrase "institutions matter" also captures
much of what APD is known for. Broadly speaking, by "institutions" we mean the rules
and procedures that structure behavior and provide incentives, norms, and resources
that shape it. Most APD scholars would include formal governmental institutions: executive bureaucracies, insulated policymakers in central banks and courts, legislatures,
and local and special purpose governments. They also mean the internal structure of
legislatures, their leadership positions, and their norms. Public law, and public policyincluding foreign policy, colonial administration, and national security policy-also
count. Informal institutions and organizations, such as political parties, groups, and
movements, clearly fall within the institutional purview. So do politically created market institutions-property rights, government-created technologies that undergird
commerce, or commercial and admiralty law-that facilitate and regulate commerce
and trade.
What does not count? This is a tough question. Elinor Ostrom's Nobel Prize-winning
work on conventions unsupported by property rights is self-consciously institutionalist (Ostrom 1990). APD scholars have a similarly catholic view of institutions. We do
not even draw the line where anthropology begins, say, with handshakes. After all, the
Supreme Court was different after Chief Justice Melville Fuller instituted the conference
handshake. Political life requires many sorts of institutions.
Of course, as our reference to Ostrom is meant to underscore and as we noted at the
outset, many scholars not affiliated with APD focus on institutions as well. Among the
many social science communities which know that "institutions matter" are rational
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choice institutionalists, including scholars who study veto pivots and their consequences
for policy, public law, and executive and legislative agenda setting and bargaining. APD
is indeed just one part of the "new institutionalism'' that emerged in the 1980s and has
moved in several different directions since then.
What APD has added, however, is a stronger preoccupation with the emergence and
relative durability of American national institutions; policy domains, and governance
arrangements. Here's an example of a question in the APD vein: does Congress continue to be a highly salient institution, and why or why not? In his work on Congress, for
example, David Mayhew has asked why Congress has remained viable-and has connected the answer to ho~ Congress is a valued source of consequential careers for taleuted and ambitious professional politicians. In taking advantage of that opportunity
structure members of Congress have strutted on the political stage, sought to shape public opinion-and simultaneously renewed and adapted Congress to the Sysyphean task
of remaining a central player in the Madisonian system (Mayhew 2000). Sarah Binder,
by contrast, has shown that rising partisan polarization, in combination with institutional arrangements and divided government, has reduced productivity in lawmaking
(Binder 2003, 2015).
Or how and why has the Fed's inde~endence grown despite its role in deepening the
1981-82 recession and in precipitating the 2007-9 recession? Despite periods of sharp
congressional criticism, the Fed's monetary and financial-regulatory authority remains
more-not less-powerful in shaping both macroeconomic performance and distribution. Why? Scholars are currently at work on these questions as well (Binder and Spindel
2013; Jacobs and King 2016).
Historically oriented scholars treat these sorts of questions and puzzles. They exercise
a keen awareness that adaptive or reconstitutive institutional change is a central dynamic
in American politics-one that appeared very early. Milkis has shown that the Founders
separated into party factions in part to save the Constitution from Hamilton's efforts to
build a strong central state appa'ratus. Swift revealed that early in the nineteenth century the Senate was changed from being something like a House of Lords into a popularly responsive and accountable legislature (Milkis 1999; Swift 1996). APD scholarship
captures, in other words, the contingent evolution of institutions, tracing the struggles
of actors inside institutions and organizations to perpetuate them, to reconstitute how
they work, or to adapt them to new challenges.
One also sees this preoccupation with institutionally reconstitutive moments in the
growing APD literature on the Civil War ahd Reconstruction (Bensel 1990; Brandwein
1999; Valelly 2014, 2004)-and in careful studies of major social policy shifts (Skocpol
1992) and in moments of regime stress (Katznelson 2014). The APD literature on interest
groups and protest movements-and a very rich APD parties literature-also underscore how APD is particularly attentive to alteration and adaptation over time, usefully
denaturalizing what otherwise would seem familiar or normal to us today. The interest
group system and its "pressure tactics" and the Washington-based standing congressiomi.l lobby are inventions, forged in specific historical contexts. Formative political
contexts have included, for example, the exclusion of women from the franchise and
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the one-party dominance of Republicans in agricultural states (Clemens 1997; Hansen
1991). Likewise, post-WWII civil rights protest in the South was critically led and shaped
by the skills and confidence of returning black veterans, thus opening a fresh angle on a
familiar story (Parker 2009 ).
-

IDEAS MATTER
As we have just stressed, APD theorizes and lucidly traces previously unexplored but
consequential, formal and informal macroinstitutional pivots, developmental paths,
and outcomes. More than other parts of the study of American politics, APD scholarship also holds that political ideas matter-that is, that they are independent forces in
politics and in the life of the American regime, as the chapters in this volume by Ericson
and Morone so richly demonstrate.
Prominent among treatments of constitutive ideas are those focusing on civic ideals
and jurisprudential and constitutional innovation. The basic text here, of course, is Louis
Hartz's 1955 masterpiece (Hartz 1955). The most sophisticated and persuasive treatment
to date of the constitutive role of political ideas-a magnum opus which eclipses Hartz's
achievement-is Rogers Smith's now classic identification of competing "civic ideals;'
that is, very richly developed, conflicting ideational traditions about who deserves
American citizenship (Smith 1997). Quite recently, in a painstaking reconstruction of
a now lost world of nineteenth-century rights discourse, Pamela Brandwein has shown
that the Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction decades were periods of exceptionally
creative thinking about the meaning of rights on the Supreme Court (Brandwein 2011).
Zackin has shown that those who have made and developed state constitutions have
done something similar-created a little known but potent tradition of "positive rights"
(Zackin 2013).
The constitutive role ofideas has also been traced for public philosophies and, in particular, for how intellectuals, activists, and-of course national party politicians have tried
to reconstitute institutions and to entrench or embed these philosophies in those institutions. Thus Howard Gillman has shown how late nineteenth-century Republicans
sought to embed their public philosophy through strategies of judicial recruitment and
institutional design of the judiciary-and in a companion study has shown how liberal
Democratic presidents sought to do the same in order to entrench modern judicial liberalism in the courts (Gillman 2002, 2006). Looking at a very different "ism;' Steven Teles
has provided a particularly nuanced and rich treatment of the "long march" of modern
legal conservatives to change the judiciary and other national institutions (Teles 2008).
Political economic ideas have also played a formative role in creating the American
polity. This is shown by scholars in what might be called the "MIT School" of American
political development, which flourished in the 1990s. Its inspiration came from how
Suzanne Berger and Charles Sabel thought about the historical politics of markets and
industrialization, technology, and manufacturing. Its exemplars demonstrated that
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political economic visions-such as powerful and elaborate theories of how to shape
industrial conflict (Hattam 1993), monetary policy (Ritter 1997), railroadization (Berk
1994; Dunlavy 1994), trade (Shoch 2001), and scientific innovation (Hart 1998)-in
turn ramified \nto party politics, economic growth, union formation, trade policy,
technology formation, and governmental planning capacities. Political economic
analysis can be seen, as well, in the magisterial studies of the late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century political parties produced by Sanders (treating the Democrats) and
Bensel (treating the Republicans)-works which show that, unlike non-ideological,
vote-getting, catch-all parties, the major parties instead had highly sophisticated.economic regulatory programs after the Civil War and into the early twentieth century
(Sanders 1999; Bense! 2000 ). '

IDENTITY FORMATION AND CIVIC STATUS
APD scholarship also increasingly attends to the political construction of identities and
civic status. On this view, race, gender, ethnicity, class, the family, and sexual orientation are not pre-political identities, whose origins and evolution are best traced by social
psychology and sociology. Instead, they are, in significant part, political constructs. The
sense of linked fate that informs an individual's conscious identification with a "race"
or a group or a gender originates in, for example, party strategies, in how public policy
creates or sharply reinforces ascriptive differences and hierarchies, and in the power of
ideas. Particularly useful in this regard is the founc;lational work of Desmond King. His
corpus of work underscores both the role of the state and of "racial orders" (that in turn
are undergirded by democratizing or hierarchy-preserving coalitions) in entrenching or
dissolving illiberal racial binaries (e.g., King 2007; King and Smith 2011).
'

YEs, THERE Is

A STATE

Another basic contribution of APD scholarship is its insistence that, like other polities,
America has a state. By that we mean a coherently (though not necessarily tightly) connected ensemble oflegitimate, stable, and resilient (but also evolving) national and subnational institutions of representation and legislation, governance, and jurisprudence
building. Skillful professionals cir~ulate into and out of these institutions according to
various calendars and schedules. Their linkages to political parties, elections, groups,
and public opinion shape their actions, views, decisions, and behavior. But such actions,
critically, are imperfectly monitored, even if there are robust, independent private communications media (DeCanio 2016). While responsive to social demands and public
opinion the men and women in the state are therefore also "autonomous;' that is, their
views and behavior are rooted in intellectual worldviews, public philosophy, "reason of
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state:' professional ethics, entrepreneurial visions of new roles for government, access
.to and dialogue with experts, and of course patriotism and public spirit. Systems of revenue extraction support this ensemble of institutions and people (Einhorn 2006; Levi
1988; Pollack 2009). So does access to copious amounts of reliable and longitudinal data
about the economy and society and expert evaluations of these data (Kelman 1987). Not
least, a monopoly over the legitimate means of force, exercised within territorial boundaries and constructed, expanded, and defended over the course of a national history,
protects and legitimates the nation and its representatives and rulers.
At one time APD's recognition that America has a state, particularly APD's emphasis
on the relative autonomy of the American state, was controversial. Around 1990 one of
, us faced ridicule at a job talk for asserting that there is a state in America, and was told
quite emphatically-to the room's evident approval-that to talk about the American
state was to talk nonsense. Sii:ice the author was then untenured, anxious, and unwilling
to set off fireworks, awkward silence ensued during this Alice-in-Wonderland moment.
But a voice in the author's head asked, "What about the Joint Economic Committee?
The Fed? The CIA? The Pentagon? The Executive Office of the President? The FBI? SEC?
FAA? FDA? CBO? OMB? BEAYBIA? EPA? CEA? DEA? LEAA? NIST? NLRB? FMS?
DARPA? IRS?" For a long, di~tracting moment the acronyms would not stop!
To be fair, the kernel of truth in the pompous censure· was a sound point, namely,
that talking about the American state can lead to abstract theorizing of the hand-waving
variety. There is some danger of this, of course-but we are struck by how the institutional orientation of APD scholars instead inclines them to concretely identify and
document the variety and functioning of actual arrangements that undergird American
governance.
APD scholarship on the state is also particularly focused-borrowing from the
discipline's methodological individualism and emphasis on agency-on the role of
state-builders. This has everything to do with the ambiguous constitutional status of the
state. As Alexander Hamilton's obsession with and career in early state building suggest,
the US Constitution indicated little about how the new nation should develop governing
capacity. Federal bureaucracies have varied in their governing authority or accountability to other political actors or the public. Exploiting the ambiguity in the Constitution,
innovative bureaucratic leaders have ~nhanced their agencies' legitimacy and effectivene.ss through forging ties with organ~ations and others in civil society (Carpenter 2001,
2010; Moore 2011; Roberts 2013).
Moreover, as we already noted, ''t,he state" is not just in Washington, DC. Throughout
American history, the federal government has encouraged, coerced, or cajoled the individual states to develop their capacity to serve many governing functions-and vice
versa (Derthick 2001). States have also done much on their own, often serving as sites
for the development of positive rights (Zackin 2013) and policy experimentation (as
Andrew Karch notes in this volume). In addition, American government has channeled
considerable governing authority through private or non-profit channels, subsidizing
or inviting organizations and business to provide services or to distribute resources that
it finances (Smith and Lipsky 1993; Dobbin and Sutton 1998). Strikingly Congress built
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a robust private enforcement regime of civil rights litigation led by lawyers outside the
federal government (Farhang 2010 ).
Relatedly, APD scholars' interest in the American state has led them to appreciate how
the resources inherent in public policies become valued by politicians and citizens even
as government's role in bestowing them may simultaneously seem "out of sight;' "hidden:' or "submerged" (Howard 1997; Mettler 2011). That paradoxical evolution, APD has
shown, has emerged historically and developmentally, and it is the cumulative result
of policy design, the making of the tax code, bureaucratic evolution, and the creation
of a myriad of government-sponsored enterprises (e.g., Fannie Mae, Farmer ,Mac, or
Sallie Mae) and other private-public partnerships (such as the Federal Accounting
Standards Board).
I
Indeed, structuring the role of the state and of government policy in the lives of
Americans has been a central project of elected officials throughout· the course of
American political development (Balogh 2009; Sparrow 2011). The titanic struggle over
Obamacare has revolved in large part around whether and how to "bring the state in:'
But the struggle has been more than a clash over the size of government and program
· affordability; ultimately th~ Affordable Care Act may change how Americans think
about the state in their lives_:__and about public policy more generally.
APD scholars do not see society alone as the prime mover in politics, and neither do
they understand that role to fall to the state; instead state and society interact in that
process, they are joined in a dance over time. Elected officials know that there is a certain social wariness about government-and they can choose to reinforce it, to accommodate it even as they expand the role of government, or to consciously challenge it,
knowing that the time is ripe for the challenge to succeed. (For general and formal discussion see Levi 1988.) For instance, the federal government, needing quick access to
revenue, instituted tax withholding during WWII. The emergency made that possible.
Most ironically, a young Milton Friedman dreamed up the idea (Zelenak 2013, 12, ch. 5).
That was a state-centered change which reconfigured the terrain of politics-and after
the war created a new normal.
Besides state-society interactions of these sorts, APD scholarship also takes state
capacity seriously-the variable (which is sometimes dependent, sometimes independent) that Skowronek brought to everyone's attention in 1982. By state capacity we mean
"government being able to do what its various legitimate principals want it to do when
they want it to:' As an independent variable it augments what officials, groups, and citizens can do in politics. But it can also constrain such actors. In a terrible crisis state
capacity can "sputter" -as Graham Allison showed in hair-raising detail in his pioneering treatment of the Cuban Miisile Crisis (Allison 1971).
Much of the literature on state capacity often (and correctly) assumes that state capacity, in a democratic context, is a democratic good. Strong or supple state capacity can
expand the menu of collectively useful initiatives for officials and citizens to think about
and discuss. Democracy features open public debate about how government ought to
acquire and deploy public resources-such as revenue, infrastructure, access to highgrade expertise, accurate and appropriate information about society and the economy,
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or means of coercion. Such debate would matter little if government could not actually
accomplish broad goals that are defined through open debate and other distinctively
democratic institutions and processes.
The focus on state capacity accordingly allows searching investigation of such large
matters as competent (or flawed) macroeconomic guidance (Grossman 2013). Instances
of both capacity and incapacity in this domain can be seen in the recent performance of
the Federal Reserve. Its weakness in financial regulation helped to precipitate the epic
· financial crisis of Fall 2008-but the creativity that it and the Treasury showed in stabilizing finance and credit helped. to rescue the American economy from a catastrophic
contraction. ·
State capacity can also be market making. Consider in this connection the Food and
Drug Administration. It has been forced to constantly balance demands to cut regulatory corners and at the same time assure the efficacy and safety of pharmaceuticals. Yet in
sustaining its regulatory capacities the FDA has been a major market maker (Carpenter
2010). The pharmaceutical industry in the United States would not exist in the form it
does wi~out the American state. Americans ingest a steady diet of useful (and for millions life-enhancing) pharmaceuticals because the American state is competent.
APD's appreciation of the state hartlly means, though, that APD scholars are cheerleaders for Leviathan. Nietzsche wrote that "the state is the coldest of all cold monsters ..."
(quoted in Rose and Miller 1992, 173). While hardly going that far in our view of the
state, we candidly acknowledge that state capacity has a very troubling side as well
(Scott1998).
That aspect of state capacity can be seen all through American history-starting with
"Indian removal" and the establishment of an administrative state to govern Native
Americans (Rockwell 2010). Another example is the enforcement of the 1850 Fugitive
Slave Act (Lubet 2010). Consider, too, the rise of colonial and imperial administration
early in the twentieth century (Moore 2011), the internment of Japanese Americans
during WWII (Hayashi 2008), the little-known role of eugenics and state-sponsored
sterilization (Hansen and King 2013), and the rise of the carceral state over the past generation (see Lerman and Weaver in this volume). Although these illiberal and punitive
facets of the state capacity variable have not received as much attention as the democracy-enhancing sides, various contemporary phenomena-the national security state
(Goldsmith 2012), the congressional maintenance of a military-industrial complex
(Thorpe 2013), and the carceral state (Gottschalk 2014)-are helping, properly, to put
"dark state capacity" on the APD agenda.

HISTORY MATTERS
APP also holds that "history matters:' All analysts of American politics grasp the
relevance of history, to be sure. What APD counsels, however, is putting history first, as
opposed to shoehorning seemingly stylized facts about American political history here
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and there into one's work. Do history systematically and explicitly, we say, and question
existing assumptions about what the facts actually are.
We also debate the many kinds of historical dynamics that shape American politics. We investigate the existence of secular trends, such as modernization, bureaucratization, or democratization. In some instances, the more striking phenomenon in
American politics is the persistence of very deep continuities. As Mayhew has often
remarked concerning the continuity of the Constitution of 1787-and as Louis Hartz
first argued, albeit more by way of bemoaning the limits of American political culture-perhaps a deep kind of non-development characterizes American politics (Hartz
1955; Mayhew 2000; Huntington 1968, ch. 2). Concerning presidential elections, Larry
Bartels has carefully documented the regularity and strength of electoral, competitiveness (Bartels 1998). As King and Smith have argued, racial orders are a permanent feature of American politics (King and Smith 2011).
But besides these steady-state constants and continuities we also wonder about a
different kind of constant-namely, various forms of recurrence. While the theory
of electoral realignment is dead (Mayhew 2002), the concept of recurring "regimes"
in presidential politics has gained considerable traction due to the analytic elegance
and power of Skowronek's handling of the idea in his portrayal of the presidency in
American politics (Skowronek 1997). APD scholars have indeed long argued for the
causal role and comparability of cycles and powerful public moods focused on uplifting political renewal (Huntington 1981; Mayhew 2005; Morone 1990, 2003). Religious
awakenings have shaped American politics more than once. The counterpoint between
renewal and entropy can extend to the political economy and to society. Thus increases
in income inequality and the emergence of debate over whether the super-rich are a
problem for American democracy has happened more than once (Hacker and Pierson
2010; Mettler 2015). America has experienced not one but two comparable "reconstructions" of African American voting rights and Southern party and electoral politics
(Valelly2004).
'
Mark Twain supposedly said something to the effect that while history may not
repeat itself it certainly rhymes. He actually never said it (no one knows who did), but
the idea captures a truth about a polity that displays the kind of stability and continuities that the American system has shown. We are a nation still strongly'tethered, for
better or worse (Levinson 2006), to the Constitution of 1787. It would be surprising if,
over the course of nearly two and a half centuries, political history did not repeat itself
(Haydu 1998).
Awareness that "history matters" also sensitizes APD scholars to the role of events
and contingency-a valuable corrective for the tendency that all of us have to think
that historical processes probably had to take the forms that they did (Shapiro and Bedi
2007). Accordingly, APD scholarship is also alive to the role of turning points and "critical junctures"-and their larger consequences (Soifer 2012; but see Collins 2007). In the
evolution of policy domains, change can happen incrementally, yes-but policy change
also happens through the episodic (sometimes fortuitous) opening of policy windows
that permit non-incremental change (Kingdon 2003).
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One turning point that regularly has been revisited and debated is the political
incorporation of organized labor (Hattam 1993; Orren 1991). In most advanced democracies the process of industrialization generated social stresses that, in turn, fostered
labor radicalism of various kinds. But Debsian socialism, despite its surge before WWI,
never transitioned into a significant political force outside certain Northern cities
and states and parts of the Upper Midwest. What explains the exceptionalist outcome
in the United States? (Archer 2007; Lipset and Marks 2000). The question matters for
comparativists-but it also matters a great deal for understanding the subsequent role of
organized labor in American politics (Greenstone 1977; Roof 2011; Vossing 2012).
Or consider polarization: the process by which party politicians have separated and
sorted themselves into rival, behaviorally cohesive, and fairly disciplined ideologic'al
camps (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006: 3). Polarization began in the 1970s and
has deepened since then (apparently asymmetrically, with the Republican Party moving further to the right than Democrats have moved to the left). In turn, that sorting
process has (among other effects) complicated and changed the leadership tasks of congressional leaders and how they coordinate campaign finance, committee assignments,
and communication with the publl 1t probably reduces the rate of policy enactment
(see McCarty, this volume). In other words, looking back we can see that the mid-197os
constituted a major turning point in APD (Borstelmann 2011).
As our discussion of polarization would suggest, an idea connected to the turning
point concept is path dependence (Pierson 2000). The basic idea here is that a turning
point becomes a process that feeds on itself and deepens-and that that happens in considerable part because more and more people adjust their behavior to take account of
the process. They act on the expectation that the process not only is here to stay but that
its emergence also requires them to adjust, or that it is materially valuable to adjust to it.
They thereby-and rather paradoxically-"lock in'' the process.
A particularly salient instance in social policy, as Paul Pierson first pointed out, is the
contributory finance, old-age income security program that we call Social Security. As
participation in the program widened and as millions began to count on it, a second
order consequence was the emergence of network externalities-that is, the creation of
linkages between the program and, for instance, private pension planning or the rise of
retirement communities. The policy began to "feed back'' into the society and economy
in ways that then permanently altered the context for debate and reform of the program
(Pierson 1994).
The linkages are not formal, of course. And, to be sure, continuous administrative initiative expanded Social Security (Derthick 1979 ). But nonetheless the expectations held
by millions of similarly situated market actors-and the actions that they undertake as a
result-have embedded Social Security in society and the economy. Moving "off path'' even through a redesign of the benefit delivery mechanism such as the accounts privatization promoted by President George W. Bush in 2005-is insuperably difficult. It is in
that sense that path dependence entails "lock-in:'
But lock-in does not always happen-indeed the why and how of retrenchment,
backlash, and failure are enduring puzzles (Chinn 2014; Patashnik 2008). Hacker has
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shown that retrenchment can occur through inaction and neglect as well as through
deliberate policy change. Staszak has adapted his analytic template of unobtrusive hµt
deep retrenchment to showing how access to the courts has gradually but thoroughly
been reduced by a wide range of actors in the wake of the rights revolution of the midtwentieth century (Hacker 2004; Staszak 2015). Yet backlash can also be quite open,
indeed unmistakable and deeply unsettling. The most spectacular case is the twodecade long struggle to disenfranchise black Southerners, starting in Florida (1889)
and ending in Georgia (1907). That backlash in turn restructured congressional politics
and national policy possibilities in ways that were evident for decades, from the,'wilson
Administration well into the 1970s.
Another facet of APD's attention to historical dynamics is recognition that multiple
types of change can happeri simultaneously-hence the fertile idea of multiple orders in
action (Orren and Skowronek 2004: 108-118). Consider the separation of powers, the
emergence of bureaucracies, the rise of policy domains, the persistence offederalism,
the proliferation oflocal and special governments (Mullin 2009), different patterns of
party-building (Galvin 2009 ), the relative autonomyofpubliclaw and the courts, and the
many institutional openings,for entrepreneurship (Sheingate 2003). American politics
offers a vast beehive of incongruous patterns of political action. They operate according
to different logics and "clocks;' as it were. On the other hand, the existence of multiple
orders in action also opens up possibilities for creative political action. Entrepreneurs
can discern and exploit the political possibilities of different orders operating in parallel.
They can innovate new institutional forms that temporarily resolve comparable problems that actors in evolving institutional settings share (Schickler 2001).
· To sum up, we seek to expand the range of our intuition that "history matters" into
a working assumption that history must matter in a remarkably wide-but also quite
specific-variety of ways. We have different names for them: regimes, orders, multiple
orders in action, layering, path dependence, cycles, disjointed pluralism, policy feedback. What each of the~e terms refers to can be found in more detail in the contributions
to the volume (see also Sheingate 2014).
All of this, we recognize, may sound like a special case of having a hammer and finding nails everywhere you look. And there is always a risk of that in social science. (For a
crisp technical discussion of the basic problem and how to partly correct for it in largeN analysis, see Bartels 1996.) But we think that the risk is worth tolerating. History is
inscribed everywhere on present.Jday American politics. How could it not be given that
the American regime is well into .its third century?
·
In fact, seeing all of the ways that history is imprinted on contemporary politics
means that APD is very much pkrt of the ever-present work of sorting out what is going
on currently in American politics. Recognizing that the present moment in American
politics has been multiply constituted means that APD scholars can shed very bright
light on the historical origins of a quite wide range of contemporary political phenomena. We can explain what some otherwise puzzling current phenomenon is a case of.
We are not limited to general remarks about how some facet of American politics arises
from the "liberal consensus" or American exceptionalism (although that might be true
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at some general level.) Rather, we can specifically state what the phenomenon is a case
of, whether it will persist, and why or why not.
To treat an important and much discussed example, when the Tea Party emerged in
2009 Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson quickly saw that this was a recurrence
of "federated organization'' for civic engagement. The Tea Party echoed an older style
of civic engagement, different from the Washington-based advocacy model of professionalized organizations that serve an organizationally inactive, dues-paying membership. The confidence that Skocpol and Williamson had in their hunch meant that they
were able to richly confirm it through interview evidence and geocoded data. They were'
able to offer the first in-depth portrait of how the Tea Party works. APD gave them the
insight with which they could address a crying professional-and public questionnamely, what was the Tea Party? As Skocpol and Williamson showed, journalists had
actually been unable to do that and had even offered rather misleading accounts of the
phenomenon. APD literally came to the political science debate first in trying to identify
the nature, significance, and likely longevity of the Tea Party (Skocpol and Williamson
2012).

I
THE IMPORTANCE OF IDENTIFYING "WHAT
HAPPENED"-AND DESCRIBING IT WELL
····················································································································································································
Two final characteristics, in our view, distinguish APD scholarship: one, that a different fundamental question underlies it more often than in other subfields, and two (and
relatedly), that answering this question requires excellent writing-much different than
the colorless, cautious prose that we too often learn to write in graduate school.
Certainly APD scholars, like most other political· scientists, often ask "why?" As the
previous section underscored, we also very much care about investigating "how:' by tracing historical processes that shaped-and shape-American politics. Far more than other
types of political science, however, APD also wants to know the answer to "what happened?" We alluded to this earlier, when y.e signaled the importance of "putting history
first:'
In the social sciences there is, quite appropriately, very strong interest in theory
building and theory testing, and also in refining techniques for causal inference and in
progressively ruling out rival explanations for important phenomena. As a scholarly
community we often say that political science aspires to reducing the generalizations
that we have, to the extent that we can do that.
APD, however, has a strong tendency to produce new accounts of the links between
past and present-and we make no apology for that. In that respect, APD scholars
resemble not molecular biologists but plant or insect biologists who identify behaviors and species that no one previously recognized. We seek to find new things that
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people have not seen before becaus,e we care very much about getting the answer to
"what happened?" right.
For example, the American welfare state is often regarded as not particularly
generous and as built on allocating stigma for the receipt of social policy benefits
beyond the universal programs of Social Security and Medicare. Yet Christopher
Howard discovered a "hidden welfare state" in his first book on social policy through
tax expenditure (Howard 1997). In turn that led him to reassess and correct a whole
range of stylized facts about American social policy in his second book, The Welfare
State Nobody Knows (Howard 2007). The mantra that programs for poor people are
poor programs simply does not stand up. The growth in Medicaid expenditure in recent
decades has been extremely robust. Stylized facts about social policy are no supstitute
for the kind of careful attention to how direct and indirect programs actually work that
Howard pioneered.
Consequently much of APD consists of counterintuitive descriptive inference.
As Keohane writes, "Descriptive inference is not the same as simple description: it
involves an inference, from known to unknown, that can be incorrect or otherwise
flawed. And both description f1nd descriptive inference often rest on the interpretation of inherently-sometiII).es deliberately-ambiguous actions" (Keohane 2009,
361).

But to do descriptive inference well means good writing and careful attention to
the reliability of the facts one assembles and how one interprets them. We do "thick
description'' in various sorts of ways-and increasingly with numbers and findings
from econometrics. We do description so that we have a more accurate grasp of our
past and a rich understanding of the historical processes that have created our presentday politics. Our audience thus is rewarded with seeing something that it had not
previously seen.
Once one of us found a prize-winning APD article characterized online as
"Wonderful on the details but woefully undertheorized:' The problem with this sort of
criticism is that it misses the contribution: the "details" undergird the originality of the
piece. "Wonderful" details don't just aggregate spontaneously like social insects or bacterial "quorum sensing:' An analyst finds them and arranges them in order to sho~ what
previously could not be seen as readily. That can sometimes require moving theory to
the wings of the stage.
Consider what David Mayhew wrote of V. 0. Key Jr. ''Anyone familiar with Key's
scholarship will be aware of his great capacity to build interesting and persuasive general points through induction: a mastery of detail produces a wealth of proper nouns
and telling instances, often accoajpanied by quantitative data, that march the reader to
a conclusion'' (Mayhew 2008, 87 ). This puts the role of good writing in descriptive inference about as succinctly as it can be put.
Description and good writing are sometimes regarded as low-tech and unscientific, no more difficult than, say, developing an R package. But those who have
read Ira Katznelson's multiple award-winning masterpiece, Fear Itself, discovered a
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confident command of telling and eye-opening particulars. They know the difference
that Katznelson's expository authority makes to the power of his book-and to its general lesson that Congress did, as much as FDR-if not more-to save American democracy, and to defend political democracy internationally, in the dark decades of the Great
Depressi<:>n and WWII (Katznelson 2014).
The larger point here is that by putting history first and knowing how to convey
historical insight, on paper APD sharply improves political science. Indeed, we
advance a proposition: no APD, no adequate study of American politics. A social science that implicitly or explicitly rests on shopworn, stale, or outdated understandings
of the political past and its relationships to the present is not-to be blunt-a social
science.
The American regime is now well over two centuries old. Doing history well, and correctly, eventually had to be internalized within political science-rather than remaining
outsourced to historians. That simply is essential for the study of American politics to
continue growing and getting better.
To be sure, Richard John's contribution to this volume underscores that such internalization is far from straightforward ~d can certainly irritate historians, not least because
political scientists are not trained as historians. Indeed, APD scholars need to be mindful of the kinds of concerns that John raises-and we need to be far more self-conscious
about the peril of selection bias in how we use secondary sources (Lustick 1996). We
also need-as Daniel Galvin's contribution underscores-to be more methodologically
self-conscious, borrowing much more than we have from the qualitative methodological revolution. Recent scholarship highlights the importance of bridging the quantitative and qualitative divide in designing and conducting research (e.g., Wawro and
Katznelson 2013). But these are precisely the kinds of issues that were certain to surface
once APD fully took root. Their emergence indeed underscores the continuing necessity and expanding relevance-of the APD approach.

RESEARCH TRAJECTORIES
We now encourage readers to discover for themselves how scholars have engaged in
APD inquiry by immersing themselves in the rich and diverse array of chapters contributed to this handbook. The first section features essays that consider broad perspectives
on APD. Here we include considerations ranging from political economy and political
culture to the role of gender and reflections on how an APD lens enables scholars to
understand contemporary politics. The second section focuses on institutions, including the various components of the separation of powers at the national level as well as on
American federalism, including a focus on cities and states. The third section examines
political processes and state-society relations, investigating such topics as representation and political parties to voting rights politics, public opinion, and interest groups.
These chapters showcase inventive approaches to studying mass political behavior over
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time, often in the absence of ideal data, and they indicate how an historical approach
may challenge prevailing views. Finally, the fourth section highlights new work on how
the state shapes the status of citizens and regulates society, shaping identities, hierarchies, and social relations in the United States. The foci range from a focus on race to the
welfare state and criminal justice to sexual orientation and the family.
As this brief summary indicates, APD scholarship is as lively, varied, and dynamic as
the phenomena it investigates. Our discussion of backlash, retrenchment, continuities,
recurrence,' and cycles suggest the wide assortment of patterns that scholars have identified, to say nothing of the insights of the impossibility theorems (discussed by Jenkins in
this volume). Political development might best be thought of-to borrow Paul Pierson's
phrase-as, simply, "politics in time" (Pierson 2004).
Our subfield has evolved in a wide array of directions over the past thirty years and
in so doing it has invigorated the discipline. It enables scholars to illuminate much
about not only the American past but also about how political processes operate and
the broad character of the American state and governance. It gives them analytic leverage, moreover, for interpreting contemporary events and politics in real time. And
it offei:s an approach to scholarship with high potential for addressing broad concerns in public affairs and engaging a wide audience including policymakers, journalists, and citizens. In that sense it fulfills one of the most important aspirations
of social science, namely that it be broadly useful to and accessible by democratic
citizens.
We hope that we have given you hope for the promise of your own APD scholarship.

NOTES
1. A comprehensive bibliography, compiled and updated by David Brian Robertson, can be
found at www.um;,l.edu/ ~robertsondb/sy431bib.html
2. See the very important registry effort at http://egap.org/about/. Also Monogan (2015).
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